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Abstract – Environmental policy has always been at the core of the EU’s activities. In 
2010, the EU adopted the Industrial Emissions Directive (‘IED’).  The IED considerably 
reformed the regulatory framework in this field and aimed to address concerns based on 
the lack of flexibility in EU governance. This contribution reviews the main 
characteristics of the IED’s second chapter, concerning integrated pollution prevention 
and control (‘IPPC’) and assesses their relevance to notions of centralisation or “legalism” 
as contrasted to de-centralisation and flexibility. It argues that even though the Directive 
makes some progress towards the right direction, a number of thorny issues still remain 
unresolved. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of industrial pollution has always been at the centre of the 
European Union’s environmental policy. Influenced by the predominant 
regulatory model of the 1970s (the “command and control”1 or “direct 
regulation”2 model) the early phase of community legislation in this field 
exhibited two key characteristics: it was premised upon a permitting system 
and it was media-specific.3 In broad brushstrokes, within national regulatory 
frameworks the traditional regulatory tool of a license or permit 
‘commanded’ compliance with a particular environmental target or 
methodology.4 Compliance was then ‘controlled’ through the imposition of 
sanctions.5 The subsequent embracement of this regulatory structure by the 
European Union implied, as Lee argues, “both command from the centre to 
the Member State and its regulators, and command and control of 
polluters”.6  
                                                
*Aliki has an LLB and an LLM in Environmental Law and Policy. She is currently 
employed as an environmental paralegal in Bond Dickinson LLP. The author is grateful 
to M. Lee for all her support and assistance in the preparation of this paper. The author 
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1 Richard B.Macrory, Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law 
(Hart Publishing 2010) chapter 3. 
2 ibid. 
3 Maria Lee, Draft paper, Blackwell Companion to EU Law and International Law 
(2012), 1. 
4 ibid. 
5 Macrory (n1).  
6 Lee (n 3). 
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Nevertheless, during the late 1980s and early 1990s this prevalent 
model of ‘command and control’ regulation came under considerable 
criticism.7 In the European Union this criticism, compounded with powerful 
pressures towards de-centralisation resulted in the adoption of novel forms 
of environmental governance. Contrary to the USA, where the pertinent 
criticism originated8, the European Union legislature did not opt for a 
generalised use of economic instruments; the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme 9  being a prominent exception. 10  Instead the European 
Union sanctioned a hybrid regulatory approach exhibiting characteristics of 
both the “old governance”11 of the 1970s and the “new governance”12 
structures, which emerged during the 1990s. The latter were premised upon 
mechanisms, which promoted, inter alia, flexibility, reflection and co-
operation “over fixed hierarchical commands”.13 The outcome of this novel 
“new, old governance” 14  approach was community legislation which 
provided Member States with the necessary flexibility in its implementation, 
without simultaneously “engaging in outright de-centralisation”.15 However, 
the novelty of the regulatory framework is not only related to the partial shift 
from centralised to de-centralised forms of governance in the European 
Union’s environmental edifice. A second significant characteristic of this 
period is the movement away from media-specific and towards integrated 
pollution regulation.16  
 This novel regulatory approach was subsequently crystallised in the 
field of industrial pollution control in Directive 96/61/EC on integrated 
                                                
7  Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting 
Architectures’ (2009) 21:2 Journal of Environment Law 179. 
8 Bruce A Ackerman and Richard B.Stewart, ‘Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives’ (1985) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental 
Law 171. 
9 Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community [2009] OJ L 
140/63. 
10 Lee (n 3). 
11  Joanne Scott and David Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the EU’ (2002) 8 ELJ 1.  
12 ibid. 
13 Lee (n3). 
14 Scott, Trubek (n11). 
15 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law-Challenges, change and decision-making (Hart 
Publishing 2005) 163. 
16 Michael G Faure and Jürgen GJ Lefevere, ‘IPPC: An Economic Perspective’ (1996) 
European Environmental Law Review 112. 
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pollution prevention and control17 (IPPCD). The Directive, which entered 
into force in 1999, presents three innovative characteristics, which 
distinguish it from earlier legislation in the field. To begin with, Gislev was 
keen to highlight the Directive’s emphasis on pollution prevention as 
opposed to earlier initiatives, which traditionally promoted “end-of-pipe 
pollution abatement measures”.18 Furthermore, the IPPCD exhibits the two 
aforementioned characteristics of the second environmental governance 
period of the European Union; an integrated approach to pollution control 
and flexibility in implementation.19 Accordingly the Directive’s envisaged 
flexibility was facilitated through the establishment of a permitting system, 
within which the regulation of pollution is primarily instituted through 
inherently flexible ‘performance-based standards’.20 These take the form of 
‘emission limit values’ (ELVs), which are to be set by the individual 
Member States in accordance with a “process-based standard”21; the ‘BAT’ 
(Best Available Techniques) standard.22 The “open-ended”23 character of 
this standard vests Member States with considerable discretion in its 
determination. More importantly, this discretion operates on the backdrop of 
an “autonomous standard setting process” 24  (known as the “Sevilla 
process”25), within which both Member States and their regulated industries 
hold a prominent position.  
 Within the EU’s diverse regulatory mosaic, the adoption of flexible 
forms of governance was perceived as crucial in ensuring the 
implementation of its demanding environmental legislation.26 Nevertheless, 
                                                
17Directive 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control  [1996] OJ L 
257 (IPPCD). 
18 Magnus Gislev, ‘European Innovation and Exchange of Information about BAT’, paper 
presented at the European Conference on “The Sevilla Process: A Driver for 
Environmental Performance in Industry” (Stuttgart, 6 - 7 April 2000) 1, available at 
http://www.ecologic-events.eu/sevilla1/en/documents/Gislev_en.PDF  
19 Maria Lee and Jane Holder, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (2nd edn, CUP 
2007), ch 9. 
20 On different types of standards, see Gertrude Lübbe-Wolf, ‘Efficient Environmental 
Legislation-On Different Philosophies of Pollution Control in Europe’ (2001) 13:1 
Journal of Environmental Law 79. 
21 Stuart Bell and David McGillivray, Environmental Law (OUP 2008), 500. 
22 Article 9(4) IPPCD. 
23 Lee (n 3), 25. 
24 Maria Lee, ‘Law and Governance of Water Protection Policy’ in Joanne Scott (ed) 
Environmental Protection (OUP 2009) ch 2.  
25 On the ‘Sevilla process’, see Harald Schoenberger, ‘Integrated pollution prevention and 
control in large industrial installations on the basis of best available techniques – The 
Sevilla Process’ (2009) 17:16 Journal of Cleaner Production 1526. 
26 Lee (n15), ch 6. 
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successive Commission reports on the implementation of the IPPCD 
appeared to challenge this presumption.27 Accordingly, the Commission’s 
vision to address the Directive’s “implementation gap”28 was promoted 
through the adoption of a new “framework directive on industrial 
emissions”29; the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED).30 The Directive, 
which recast the IPPCD and six other sectoral Directives into a single 
legislative act, is divided into seven chapters. Notwithstanding the 
significant issues raised by all of them, only the second chapter, which 
contains “the core of the old IPPC Directive”31, is discussed at this paper.   
Even though the Directive retains the fundamental principles of the 
IPPCD-the principle of integration and the ‘BAT’ principle-intact, it 
appears, at least on the face of it, as being more centralised than its 
predecessor.32 According to Lee, some may view this Directive as signifying 
“the death of new governance”.33 In the same vein, it is unarguably true that 
the IED brought about a number of changes aimed at enhancing the legal 
status of the ‘BAT’ standard.34 Nevertheless as it will be subsequently 
argued, these changes were in fact only incremental in character.35 This 
assumption is particularly significant for two reasons. To begin with, it 
refutes the initial misconception of the more centralised character of the 
Directive. Similarly to its predecessor, the IED appears to exhibit 
characteristics that could fit in with both a centralised and a decentralised 
account of the EU’s environmental regulation.36 Moreover, the incremental 
character of the changes employed by the Directive poses interesting 
questions about its effectiveness. Indeed, a number of academics have 
                                                
27  For the latest report, see Commission, Report from the Commission on the 
implementation of Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention 
COM(2010) 593 final. 
28 On the ‘implementation gap’ in the European Union’s environmental law, see Lee (n 
15) ch 3. 
29 Ludwig Kramer, EU Environmental Law (Sweet and Maxwell 2011), 163. 
30 Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions OJ 2010 L 334/17 (IED). 
31 Bettina.Lange, ‘The EU Directive on Industrial Emissions: Squaring the Circle of 
Integrated, Harmonised and Ambitious Technology Standards?’ (2011) 13 Environmental 
Law Review 169. 
32 Lee (n 3), 3. 
33 ibid.  
34 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  
on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) COM(2007) 844 
final. 
35 Andrew Farmer, ‘Revising IPPC: Incremental Change Rather than a Radical Overhaul 
of EU Industrial Emissions Policy’ (2008) 10:4 Environmental Law Review 258. 
36 Lee (n 3), 3. 
 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
 
expressed concerns regarding the potential of the new IED to overcome the 
previously observed implementation problems and ultimately achieve its 
ambitious goal; “a high level of protection of the environment taken as a 
whole”.37 It could therefore be maintained that the IED is indeed capable of 
narrating a tale of optimism, albeit one shadowed by considerable caution.  
 In light of the above, this paper, which draws on the work of Lee, will 
succinctly review the main characteristics of the IED and their relevance to 
notions of centralisation or “legalism”38 as contrasted to de-centralisation 
and flexibility. On the backdrop of the ‘implementation gap’ already 
identified under the previous regime, the potential of the mechanisms 
employed by the IED to address it will be subsequently assessed. A tentative 
conclusion will then be drawn that even though some progress towards the 
right direction has already been made, a number of thorny issues still remain 
unresolved.  
B. PART I: DEBATING SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE 
INDUSTRIAL EMISSIONS DIRECTIVE 
1. THE DIRECTIVE’S SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS  
Similarly to its predecessor the IED utilises a conventional ‘command and 
control’ instrument for the regulation of industrial pollution; the IPPC 
permit.39 In line with the Directive’s integration principle, this regulatory 
instrument aims at ensuring both the necessary administrative and 
substantive integration.40 As far as administrative integration is concerned, 
the Directive requires only the full co-ordination of different agencies in 
granting the permit and not the establishment of a single permitting 
agency. 41  This minimum form of integration, clearly illustrates the 
Directive’s deference to the regulatory traditions of the diverse Member 
States.42 
 Subsequently substantive integration is promoted through an array of 
regulatory standards, which should be incorporated into individual IPPC 
permits. Based on the traditional taxonomy of standards, the standards 
employed by the IED could be divided into three broad categories: “ambient 
                                                
37 Article 1 IED. For the concerns, see parts II, III. 
38 Lee (n3), 3.  
39 Article 4 IED.  
40 On the different meanings of ‘integration’, see Richard Macrory, ‘Seminar on Industrial 
Emissions Control’ LLM EU Environmental Law II 2011/2012.  
41 ibid and article 5(2) IED. 
42 Macrory (n 40). 
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environmental quality”43 (or “target”44), “performance-based or output”45 
and “specification or input” 46 standards.  ‘Target’ standards, which “relate to 
the quality of the receiving medium”47, are explicitly provided for (in the 
form of EQS48) in article 18 IED. These EQS, which are traditionally set on 
a “single medium basis”49, appear rather incompatible with the “cross media 
pollution assessment”50 required by the principle of substantive integration.51 
On the contrary, this principle is fully respected by the Directive’s 
“emission- or performance-based standards”. 52  These take the form of 
ELVs53, which according to article 14(1) IED should have regard to the 
potential of their regulated substances “to transfer pollution from one 
medium to another”. A significant feature of this type of standards is their 
flexible character. Whilst “prescribing levels of pollutants which may be 
discharged from an installation”54, ‘emission-based standards’ nevertheless 
allow, at least in principle, the operator to decide how best to meet the 
imposed conditions. 55 
Nonetheless, the Directive’s third category of standards (‘specification 
standards’) appears to be the most significant in the promotion of substantive 
integration. Not only does the Directive’s ‘BAT’ standard aspire to the same 
“environment as a whole analysis”56 as the aforementioned ‘emission-based 
standards’; it also and more importantly exhibits some of the key 
characteristics of the “lifecycle approach”57 advocated by the 1991 OECD 
                                                
43 Joanne Scott, ‘Flexibility in the Implementation of EC Environmental Law’ (2000) 
Yearbook of European Environmental Law 41. 
44 Anthony I Ogus, ‘Standard Setting for Environmental Protection: Principles and 
Processes’ in Michael G Faure, John Vervaele and Albert Weale (eds) Environmental 
Standards in the European Union in an Interdisciplinary Framework (Blackstone 1994), 
27.  
45 ibid.  
46 ibid.  
47 Macrory (n 1), 159. 
48 Environmental Quality Standards (EQS).  
49 ibid. EQS are included for instance in the Water Framework Directive (Directive 
2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
[2000] OJ L327/1) (WFD). 
50 Macrory (n 40). 
51 Lee (n 3). 
52 Lubbe-Wolf, (n 20). 
53 Emission Limit Values (ELVs). 
54 Macrory (n 1). 
55 Lubbe-Wolf (n 20). 
56 Article 1(10) IED. 
57  MJ Nicholas et al, ‘Determination of ‘Best Available Techniques’ for Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control: A Life Cycle Approach’ (2000) 78: B3 Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection 193. 
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Environmental Monograph.58 Accordingly, Annex III IED (which lists the 
criteria that need to be considered in the determination of ‘BAT’59) places 
particular emphasis on “low waste technology, energy efficiency and the 
recovery and recycling of waste”. This allows, according to Macrory, the 
“wider integration of environmental concerns”60 in individual IPPC permits. 
However, the significance of the ‘BAT’ standard is not solely related 
to its potential to promote an advanced form of substantive integration. 
Instead, as O’Malley contends, the ‘BAT’ standard provides “the principle 
benchmark for determining the obligations of industrial operators in respect 
of pollution prevention and control”.61 Therefore, irrespective of whether the 
permit conditions include ELVs62 or “equivalent parameters or technical 
measures”63, these should always “be based on the best available techniques, 
without prescribing the use of any technique or specific technology”.64 This 
last phrase is particularly important since it distinguishes the ‘BAT’ standard 
from the general category of ‘specification standards’. Traditionally 
‘specification standards’ have been perceived as prescribing “particular 
forms of technical solutions”65, which had to be strictly complied with. They 
had therefore been associated with regulatory rigidity and inefficiency.66 
However, the ‘BAT’ standard appears to challenge this presumption. To 
begin with, article 3(10) IED, which contains the ‘BAT’ definition, coupled 
with the aforementioned Annex III IED, would appear to endow the ‘BAT’ 
standard with considerable prescriptive value. However its in-depth review 
appears to challenge this initial understanding. Subsequently, ‘best’ is 
contingent upon the technique’s potential to achieve “a high general level of 
protection of the environment as a whole”.67 Since the Directive does not 
define the level of protection which needs to be achieved, the latter is 
informed by the totality of the European Union’s environmental 
                                                
58 Macrory (n 40); OECD, Organisation for Economic Cooperatives and Development 
(1991) Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control. Environment Monograph No 37. 
59 Article 14(6) IED.  
60 Macrory (n 40). 
61 V O’Malley, ‘The Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control IPPC Directive and its 
implications for the environment and industrial activities in Europe’ (1999) 59 Sensors 
and Actuators B, 78. 
62 The IED prioritises ELVs as a means of incorporating the ‘BAT’ standard in individual 
permits. See: Lubbe-Wolf (n 20). 
63 Article 14(2) IED.  
64 Article 15(2) IED.  
65 Macrory (n 1), 159. 
66 Lubbe-Wolf (n 20).  
67 Article 3(10) IED.  
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legislation.68 Moreover, the ‘availability’ of a technique is assessed on the 
basis of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA).69 Importantly though, the Directive 
provides “no further detail on either which costs and advantages might be 
relevant or the appropriate response to these costs and advantages”.70 
Accordingly, the Commission in its interpretation of the ‘BAT’ concept, 
perceived this CBA as primarily mandating “an assessment of the estimated 
net costs of implementing a technique in relation to the environmental 
benefits achieved through its implementation”.71 Nevertheless, bearing in 
mind the “highly speculative” 72  character of any assessment of 
environmental benefits as opposed to the more straightforward costs of 
environmental protection, the outcome of any such an analysis is far from 
clear.73 Finally, even the term ‘techniques’ appears to be phrased in rather 
abstract terms. According to the EEB, this refers not only to the installation’s 
“hardware”74 (“the technology used”75) but also to its “software”76 (“the way 
in which the installation is designed…operated and decommissioned”77). 
Even though the former is relatively easy to define (it includes such aspects 
as “filters and other end-of-pipe technologies”78), the latter’s broad character 
effectively renders any definition elusive. In light of the above, Lee righty 
argued that “whilst there is considerable detail in the Directive on BAT, that 
detail is rather open-ended”.79 As such the ‘BAT’ standard provides, at least 
in principle, both Member States and individual operators with substantial 
flexibility in the determination of its content.80 And it is precisely this 
flexibility that rebuts the long-established presumption regarding the rigidity 
of ‘specification standards’.  
 
2. THE DIRECTIVE’S PROCEDURAL ASPECTS  
                                                
68 European Environmental Bureau (EEB), New Features under the Industrial Emissions 
Directive (2011) 4, available at  http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/activities/industry-
health/industrial-emissions/the-eebs-position/.   
69 Commission, On the Road to Sustainable Production, COM(2003) 354 final, 14.  
70 Lee (n 15), 167. 
71 Commission (n 69), 15. 
72 Ogus (n 44), 26. 
73 Lee (n 3), 7.  
74 EEB (n 68), 4.  
75 Article 1(10) IED. 
76 EEB (n 68), 4. 
77 Article 1(10) IED. 
78 EEB (n 68), 4. 
79 Lee (n 15), 167. 
80 ibid, 168.  
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The academic debate generated by the adoption of the IED focused, inter 
alia, on the Directive’s “proceduralising”81 character. Within the European 
Union’s environmental edifice, ‘proceduralisation’ appears to play two 
different roles. 82 On the one hand, the legislation’s emphasis on procedure 
as opposed to detailed substantive standards provides Member States with 
the necessary flexibility in its implementation. On the other hand, 
‘proceduralisation’ frequently operates to constrain this flexibility. 
Accordingly, the imposition of reporting obligations upon Member States 
under article 72 IED and the Directive’s emphasis on public participation 
under article 24 IED, clearly illustrate this latter function of 
‘proceduralisation’. 83  On the contrary, the IED’s “norm generation” 84 
process, the ‘Sevilla process’, appears to resonate more with the former, 
facilitative role of the concept.85  
Notwithstanding the significant roles played under the IED by the 
aforementioned procedural aspects, the focus of this part will solely be on 
the ‘Sevilla process’. To begin with, the original IPPCD made no reference 
either to this process or to its outcome; the ‘BAT Reference documents’86 
(BREFs). Article 16(2) IPPCD simply mandated the Commission “to 
organise an exchange of information between Member States and the 
industries concerned on best available techniques”. Nevertheless, this 
‘information exchange’ rapidly “evolved beyond the terms of the 
legislation” 87  into a robust “forum for multi-level collaborative 
governance” 88 , which closely resembles the Common Implementation 
Strategy89 (CIS) established under the Water Framework Directive90 (WFD). 
                                                
81 On ‘proceduralising directives’ see Lee (n 15), ch 6. 
82 William Howarth, ‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: 
Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities’ (2009) 21:3 Journal of Environmental 
Law, 391. 
83 Lee (n 3).  
84 ibid 6. 
85 See part II of this paper. 
86 According to article 3(11) IED: “‘BAT Reference Document’ means a document, 
resulting from the exchange of information organised pursuant to Article 13, drawn up for 
defined activities and describing, in particular, applied techniques […] and any emerging 
techniques, giving special consideration to the criteria listed in Annex III”. 
87 Lee (n 3), 8. 
88 Jane Holder and Joanne Scott, ‘Law and ‘New’ Environmental Governance in the 
European Union’ [2004] p3, available at: http://wwws-
a.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge/docs/Scott%20and%20Holder.pdf. 
89 Strategic Document, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC). 
90 Water Framework Directive (n 49). 
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Similarly to the IPPCD, the WFD makes no mention to this Strategy, which 
was subsequently perceived as tentatively premised upon recital 14 of the 
WFD’s preamble.91 Accordingly, the informal character of these processes 
meant that their outcome (‘BREFs’ under the ‘Sevilla process’ and 
“guidance documents”92 under the CIS) was perceived as having a non-
binding character.93 It is important though to note, that the IED, radically 
changed the legal status of the ‘BREFs’; a point which will be further 
analysed in part III.   
Nonetheless, even prior to the adoption of the IED, which firmly 
entrenched both the ‘Sevilla process’ and its ‘BREF documents’ in the 
European Union’s legislative framework, academics were keen to emphasise 
the significance of this process. Bearing in mind the open-ended character of 
the IED’s ‘BAT’ standard and the difficulties associated with its 
determination, the ‘Sevilla process’ appears to play a crucial role in assisting 
Member States in the implementation of the IED. Indeed, by establishing the 
‘best available techniques’ for different industrial sectors at the Union level, 
the Sevilla process’ ‘BREF documents’ can substantially reinforce the 
Member States’ efforts to determine BAT at the national level.94 In the same 
vein, Lee was keen to emphasise the potential of the ‘Sevilla process’ to 
operate as a mechanism of “institutional learning”.95 By bringing together a 
variety of state and non-state actors, this process effectively facilitates the 
dissemination of “a large number of technical information on what is ‘best 
practice’ in different countries”.96 This is particularly significant since, as 
Emmott argues, “this (information) might otherwise be unavailable to 
regulators and industry in some Member States”.97 In this context, the 
quality of implementation appears to be directly linked with the availability 
of information. Even though there is some truth in the argument that the 
Sevilla process’  ‘information reserve’ will promote better implementation, 
this is far from straightforward. As will be subsequently discussed, there are 
                                                
91 Lee (n 24). 
92 Strategic Document (n 89), 2. 
93 Lee (n 24), 53. 
94 See part III below. Attention should be paid  in particular to Lange’s argument about 
the ‘expectation of closure’ created by the ‘Sevilla process, in Bettina Lange, 
Implementing EU Pollution Control-Law and Integration (CUP 2008), ch 6.  
95 Lee (n 3), 20.  
96 Neil Emmott, ‘IPPC and Beyond—Developing a Strategic Approach to Industry for 
European Environmental Policy’ (1999) 1:1 Journal of Environmental Policy and 
Planning 77, 79. 
97 ibid.   
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a number of factors that constrain the ability of Member States to take full 
advantage of the Sevilla process’ learning edifice.98   
  Furthermore, within the Sevilla process’ framework ‘institutional 
learning’ becomes entangled with the notions of “deliberation” 99  and 
“technological innovation”.100 To begin with, Scott perceives this process as 
premised upon a deliberative ideal, which effectively “privileges critical 
reason, over power”101 and is therefore capable of producing improved 
outcomes; in this case high quality ‘BREFs’. 102  It is precisely this 
deliberative exercise that allows participants to learn from each other and to 
cooperate in the formulation of ‘BREFs’ that fosters technological 
innovation; thus allowing for instance the development of “cleaner 
production techniques”.103 In light of the above, the Sevilla process’ ability 
to operate as a “key driver for improved environmental performance in the 
European Union” 104  clearly resonates with the Union’s aspiration to 
demonstrate environmental leadership on the international plane.105 
 
3. PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE, FLEXIBILITY AND “LEGALISM”106 
The open-ended character of the Directive’s core substantive standard-the 
‘BAT’ standard-, the inherently flexible ELVs and the emphasis on 
procedure as a mechanism of determining the content of ‘BAT’, would 
appear to refute the argument that the IED is more centralised than its 
predecessor; the IPPCD. However, the interplay between the Directive’s 
diverse regulatory standards, the ability of ‘procedure’ to constrain 
flexibility and most importantly the enhanced legal status of the ‘BAT’ 
standard under the IED, appear to align the Directive with concepts of 
                                                
98 Charalambos Koutalakis et.al. ‘When Soft Regulation is not enough: the Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Directive of the European Union’ (2010) Regulation & 
Governance 4, 329.  
99 Scott (n 43), 58.  
100 Gislev, (n 18) 1.  
101 Scott (n 43), 59. 
102 On the importance of deliberation for the achievement of ‘better solutions’, see Jenny 
Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem‐
solving Approach’ (2001) 21 (3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415. 
103 O’Malley (n 61), 80. 
104 Commission (n 69), 16. 
105 The European Union’s desire to demonstrate environmental leadership is particularly 
evident in the field of climate change. The ‘Climate and Energy Package’ (2008) was 
clearly underpinned by this rationale.  
106 Lee (n 3), 3  
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“legalism or interventionist regulation”. 107  This juxtaposition of 
characteristics belonging to different governance models (decentralised and 
centralised respectively) already existed in the IPPCD. The fact that the IED 
largely replicates the governance structure of its predecessor may indicate 
the Commission’s faith in “new, old governance” 108  and 
“experimentalism”.109 It may though equally indicate the Commission’s 
inability to fully comprehend the issues that generated the ‘implementation 
gap’ in the first place.  
C. PART II: THE ‘SEVILLA PROCESS’ REVISITED 
 
1. THE “IMPLEMENTATION DEFICIT”110 OF THE IPPC DIRECTIVE 
The outcome of a protracted period of negotiations, the IED aimed 
principally at addressing the IPPC Directive’s implementation deficit.111 
Within this context the Member States’ limited implementation of the IPPC 
Directive’s ‘BAT’ standard, appeared to be a recurrent theme in all 
Commission’s reports and communications. Accordingly, the Commission’s 
most recent report on the IPPCD explicitly stated that “the main problem 
[…] is the low proportion of permits reflecting the implementation of BAT, 
as indicated in the relevant BAT reference documents (BREFs)”.112 As it 
will be subsequently discussed, a simple deviation from the ‘BREFs’ did not 
suggest failure on behalf of the Member State to comply with its obligations 
under the Directive.113 However, the setting of permit conditions on the basis 
of an arbitrarily chosen standard meant that the Member State was in breach 
of its core obligation under the IPPCD; the obligation to set permit 
conditions solely on ‘BAT’.114  
In light of the above, both the Commission and academics have 
attempted to identify the factors that account for this situation. To begin 
with, “the vague provisions on BAT” 115  and the “large degree of 
                                                
107 ibid.  
108 On ‘new, old governance’, see Scott, Trubek (n 11). 
109 On ‘experimentalist governance’ in the EU, see Lee (n 3) p3 and Charles F Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist 
Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14:3 European Law Journal, 271. 
110 On the ‘implementation gap’ in the European Union’s environmental law see Lee (n 
15,) ch 3. 
111 Commission (n 34). 
112 Commission (n 27), 4.  
113 Lee (n 3), 14. 
114 Article 9(4) IPPCD.  
115 Commission (n 34), 9.  
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flexibility”116  afforded to Member States to deviate from BAT in the 
permitting process have been considered as the principle rationales for the 
limited implementation of the ‘BAT’ standard. Similarly, “the unclear role 
of the BREFs”117, their highly technical character and the fact that they were 
only published in English, meant that these documents were of limited value 
for a number of “weak”118-in terms of their capacities-Member States.119 In 
addition, concerns about the “unbalanced” 120  character of the ‘Sevilla 
process’ and the predominantly political character of the debates taking 
place within its ambit, provided an additional explanation for the restricted 
use of ‘BREFs’ by individual Member States.121 As a result, the alleviation 
of the aforementioned implementation hurdles was promoted under the IED 
through a variety of measures. These could be broadly grouped under two 
categories. The first is comprised of measures aimed explicitly at addressing 
the concerns permeating the ‘Sevilla process’, whereas the second is focused 
on measures aimed at enhancing the legal status of ‘BAT’ under the 
Directive.  
 
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ‘SEVILLA PROCESS’ 
As Lee contends “in many respects, article 13 IED places the status quo on a 
legislative basis”.122 Therefore, the decision to draw up, review or update a 
‘BREF document’ rests with the Commission, which “should aim to update 
BAT reference documents not later than 8 years after the publication of the 
previous version”.123 The expectation that the Commission will frequently 
review the ‘BREF documents’ clearly resonates with the evolving character 
of the ‘BAT’ standard.124 Moreover, ‘Technical Working Groups’ (TWGs) 
consisting of “Member States, the industries concerned, non-governmental 
organisations promoting environmental protection and the Commission”125, 
                                                
116 ibid. 
117 ibid. 
118 On a discussion about ‘weak states’ and their implementation hurdles, see Koutalakis 
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continue to represent the technical limp of the process, as opposed to the 
Forum, which represents the political one. 126  Under the IED, the 
composition of these TWGs is defined by the Forum.127 This effectively 
circumscribes the right of environmental interest groups and industry to 
participate in BREF drafting, since they now have to be directly nominated 
by the Forum. In the same vein, a significant development under the new 
Directive was the “institutionalisation of the practice of the (IPPC 
Directive’s) information exchange forum (IEF)” 128  through the 
establishment of the Forum. Accordingly the Forum is comprised of 
“representatives of Member States, international organisations representing 
the industries concerned and environmental interest groups which have an 
acceptable degree of European representation”.129 Given that the choice of 
participants greatly impacts upon the final outcome of the process, the 
delineation of the Forum’s membership could indeed have far-reaching 
implications. Even more so since according to article 13, the Forum is 
expected to provide its opinion on a variety of matters, including the highly 
significant “content of the BAT reference documents”.130 Nevertheless, one 
of the key changes brought about by the IED was the introduction in the 
‘Sevilla process’ of a second political-tier; a comitology committee.131 
According to article 13(5) IED “decisions on the BAT conclusions shall be 
adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure referred to in Article 
75(2)”. Whereas according to article 3(12) IED “BAT conclusions” are 
defined as “a document containing the parts of a BAT reference document 
laying down the conclusions on best available techniques”. The significance 
of these provisions will become evident from the ensuing discussion.  
 
3. THE UNBALANCED ‘SEVILLA PROCESS’ 
Ever since its inception, the ‘Sevilla process’ was perceived as a deliberative 
framework within which, both state and non-state actors, would participate 
on equal footing in the determination of sectoral ‘BATs’. However Lange’s 
empirical account of the process clearly challenges this initial perception.132 
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Within this context, the unbalanced character of the process has been 
emphatically underscored. This characterisation essentially criticises the fact 
that, within the Sevilla process’ edifice industry holds a more prominent 
position than the other non-state actor of the process; NGOs.133 To begin 
with, it is important to note that the industry’s robust participation in the 
‘Sevilla process’ is not inherently problematic. Both Lee and Don Litten 
highlighted the advantages of such a situation for all the involved parties.134 
For instance, Lee perceived this as an opportunity for the other participants 
“to learn from and to use the information resources of industry”135 in the 
determination of the “dynamic BAT standard”.136 Notwithstanding these 
arguments, it would appear that it is precisely this “informational 
asymmetry”137 between the different actors that turns industry’s prominence 
into ‘unsettling’ dominance. Even though under the ‘Sevilla process’ “the 
most comprehensive information usually originates from industry”138, the 
quality of this information is far from guaranteed. According to the 
Commission “economic data are frequently not made available, and when 
they are, it is usually not possible to cross-check them with data from other 
sources”.139 Bearing in mind the centrality of the ‘cost-benefits analysis’ for 
‘BAT’ determinations, the lack or even poor quality of available economic 
data appears particularly problematic. Consequently “industry’s control over 
information”140 and a number of arguments against its disclosure resulted in 
serious concerns about the reliability of the ‘Sevilla process’ being raised. 
 The employment of mechanisms aimed at enhancing the transparency 
of the process was therefore considered as an appropriate response to these 
concerns. The publication in 2006 of the horizontal “BREF on economics 
and cross-media effects”141  was perceived as a step towards the right 
direction. Indeed as stated in the document the key purpose of its 
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methodologies is to ensure “transparency so that any part of the process can 
be validated or audited”.142 In this context, transparency does not only refer 
to the quality and availability of information that feeds into the process, but 
also and primarily to the way this information is treated by the participants 
of the process. This claim in favour of transparency could therefore be 
perceived as facilitating internal or “peer scrutiny”.143 Here the role of NGOs 
appears particularly important. Their participation in the Sevilla process’ 
institutions provides them with the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of 
the data provided both by industry and Member States and thus potentially 
operate as an informal pressure mechanism for the improvement of those 
actors’ performance.144 However, the delineation of their participatory rights 
under the IED and the “resource intensive”145 character of the ‘Sevilla 
process’, mean that NGOs cannot always take full advantage of the 
aforementioned opportunity.  
 Moreover arguments in favour of transparency in the ‘Sevilla process’ 
are inextricably linked with mechanisms aimed at facilitating “external”146 or 
public scrutiny of the process. The latter is predominantly promoted through 
the EIPPCB147, the website of which provides ample information on the 
‘Sevilla process’ and its outcome; the ‘BREFs’. Regrettably though, 
information about the process’ specific participants (for instance their names 
or at least their professional affiliation) is no longer made publicly available 
by the Bureau, due to database protection rules.148 Taking into account the 
pervasive discourse over “industry bias”149 in ‘BREF’ writing, being able to 
identify the source of information that underpins this process, is “a bare 
minimum, even if not the full picture”.150  
 In the same vein, this form of public scrutiny is further enhanced by 
the participatory mechanism of article 24 IED. According to Lange “BAT 
determinations are embedded in a multi-level governance system”151 with 
the final level being occupied by Member States’ competent authorities, 
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which define “BAT in IPPC licenses for specific sites”.152 Subsequently the 
public’s (civil society and NGOs) ability to participate in the individual 
Member States’ “permit procedure” 153 , appears particularly important. 
Indeed information submitted at this stage may not only challenge the 
information that formed the basis of the ‘BREF’ process but also operate as 
a gap-filling mechanism in cases of ‘information-deficits’. Accordingly, it is 
envisaged that competent authorities will use this information in order to 
justify, under article 14(4) IED, the imposition of permit conditions that are 
stricter than those contained in ‘BAT conclusions’. And even though this 
provision opens-up the possibility for Member States to voice their concerns 
over the reliability of the ‘BREF’ process, its application will be most likely 
strongly opposed by industry.154 In addition, a number of academics have 
already highlighted the potential of participatory processes, in practice, to 
exclude (either directly or indirectly) specific segments of society; usually 
those that lack the necessary cognitive or particularly in the case of NGOs, 
financial resources.155 Unarguably, this situation questions the value of the 
IED’s participatory processes.  
 Finally, the newly introduced comitology procedure would appear to 
provide a better response to concerns about the unbalanced character of the 
‘Sevilla process’. In contrast to the other political institution of the process, 
the Forum, the article 75 comitology committee is envisioned as sheltered 
from industry’s influence. Within this “protected space”156, Member States 
are given “an additional opportunity to intervene during the adoption of the 
BAT conclusions”. 157  Nevertheless, the establishment of a comitology 
committee does not fully obliterate concerns about the Sevilla process’ 
biased character. In this respect particular emphasis has been placed on 
comitology’s own “legitimacy issues”158, which are principally related to its 
“isolation from public scrutiny and from the democratic control of 
Parliament”.159 Even though the new comitology procedure provided the 
European Parliament (and the Council) with “the right of scrutiny”160, the 
implications of this right are not as far-reaching as they may initially seem. 
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The European Parliament’s power to check “whether implementing powers 
have been overstepped”161, means that the Parliament could use this power 
to scrutinize ‘BAT’ as defined in ‘draft BAT conclusions’ for conformity 
with its legislative definition under article 3(10) IED. Lee considers this as a 
significant opportunity for the Parliament to “flag political concerns in 
extremis”.162 Although there is some truth in this argument, it is important to 
note that, under the comitology procedure, the decision whether to amend or 
withdraw the draft implementing act rests ultimately with the 
Commission.163 This clearly diminishes the importance of the European 
Parliament’s contribution in practice. 
 The debate over the unbalanced character of the ‘Sevilla process’ has 
principally focused on the “power dynamics”164 existing between industry 
and NGOs. However, Lange’s account of the “North-South imbalances in 
BREF writing”165, elucidate another side of the problem. Accordingly, a 
claim that has been frequently advanced by the Sevilla process’ participants 
was that “Northern European Countries were exerting too much influence 
upon BAT definitions”.166 This influence could in some instances, as in the 
case of Germany and the Netherlands, be justified by the countries’ 
considerable contributions-in terms of data and related information-in the 
process.167 Yet, in the majority of cases, “interest representation”168 rather 
than evidence-based argumentation underpinned State’s attempts to steer the 
process towards a specific outcome. Within this context, states characterised 
by “weak economic, social and administrative conditions”169, lacked the 
necessary “regulatory and commercial power”170 to successfully participate 
in the process. This discrepancy in the ‘bargaining power’ of different 
Member States was also reflected on the produced ‘BREFs’. The latter 
essentially crystallised “the state of BAT of advanced Northern and Western 
European industry”.171    
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4. THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF A TECHNICAL DISCOURSE  
Decision-making under the ‘Sevilla process’ was originally envisaged as 
premised upon two strictly delineated discourses; a “technical discourse”172 
taking place within expert-led TWGs and a political discourse confined in 
what was formerly known as the IEF.173 However, empirical evidence 
appeared to challenge this perception.  In particular the incorporation of 
policy issues in the discussions of TWGs created concerns about the 
dominance of politics over science in ‘BAT’ determinations.174 To begin 
with, the convergence of technical and policy or value-based arguments is 
not inherently problematic. ‘BAT’ is by definition an open-ended, flexible 
standard and the choice of ‘BAT’ for a particular industrial sector 
presupposes a choice between the diverse environmental, economic and 
societal benefits of the available ‘BAT’ options.175 These value judgments-
the choice for instance between a ‘BAT’ that results in ELVs, which 
contribute to global warming and another with ELVs, which contribute to 
water pollution-permeate both tiers (technical and political) of the Sevilla 
process. 176 In the same vein, a purely technical discourse within the TWGs 
runs the risk of reducing “highly political choices”177, as the one previously 
mentioned, into mere technical calculations.178 On the other hand, simple 
negotiation over the outcome raises questions about the credibility of ‘BREF 
documents’.  
Nevertheless, it would appear that negotiation, “hard and soft 
bargaining”179 and an effort to reconcile the diverse interests of various 
participants have frequently dominated the discussions of TWGs. On this 
account, “interests or preferences”180 could be perceived as only loosely 
connected with the value judgments inherent in ‘BAT’ determinations. 
Indeed a Member State’s preference for a specific ‘BAT’ could be primarily 
driven by its desire to retain the status quo of its own industry and only to a 
lesser extent by general policy considerations.181 This clearly illustrates the 
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nebulous character of ‘interests’. Within the ‘Sevilla process’ a watertight 
delineation between Member States as proponents of the public interest and 
industry representatives as advocates of private interests, appears 
untenable. 182  Within this context, disclosure of information about the 
participants of the ‘Sevilla process’ becomes even more significant. Even 
more so, since the introduction of the comitology committee and the 
enhancement of the legal status of ‘BREFs’ under the IED, is bound to 
accentuate the political character of the TWGs’ debates.183  
D. PART III: THE ENHANCED STATUS OF ‘BAT REFERENCE DOCUMENTS’ 
 
1. AN OVERVIEW  
One of the main concerns under the previous regime of the IPPCD was the 
limited application of the ‘BAT’ standard; a problem which was particularly 
observed in the weaker Member States of the European Union (mainly states 
situated in Southern and Eastern Europe). 184  In order to address this 
situation, the IED adopted a number of measures, which principally aimed at 
enhancing the status of ‘BAT’ within national permitting systems. To begin 
with, for the first time a definition of the ‘BREF documents’ and ‘BAT 
conclusions’ is included in the Directive.185 The Directive also contains a 
definition of “emerging techniques”186, which are expected to form an 
integral part of the ‘BREFs’ under the new regime. This clearly illustrates 
the IED’s unequivocal commitment to notions of “reflexivity” 187  and 
“learning”.188 ‘BAT’ is an inherently ‘dynamic concept’ and the obligation 
imposed on the Sevilla process’ participants to consider not only existing 
best available techniques, but also techniques that are most likely to 
“become BAT in the near future”189 clearly facilitates its constant evolution.  
Nevertheless, the most important measure adopted by the Directive 
regarded the legal status of the ‘BREF documents’ and more specifically 
those parts of the documents that contained their conclusions on ‘BAT’.190 In 
contrast to the previous regime, where ‘BREFs’ were just one of the factors 
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to be taken into consideration when determining ‘BAT’ in individual 
permits, ‘BAT conclusions’ are now “the reference for setting permit 
conditions”.191 However this is not the end of the story. Interestingly, under 
the IED two categories of ‘BAT conclusions’ with different consequences 
co-exist. The first includes ‘BAT conclusions’ that have been formally 
adopted as implementing acts through a comitology decision.192 These are 
explicitly binding in terms of the ELVs prescribed in them.193 According to 
article 15(3) IED, “the competent authority shall set emission limit values 
that ensure that, under normal operating conditions, emissions do not exceed 
the emission levels associated with the best available techniques as laid 
down in the decisions on BAT conclusions referred to in Article 13(5)”. 
Furthermore, the adoption of these conclusions through comitology has the 
effect of obliging the Commission to make them available in all the official 
languages of the Union.194 This appears to be a significant step towards the 
alleviation of some of the difficulties experienced by national authorities 
under the former regime. Finally, the existence of a comitology decision also 
impacts upon the competent authorities’ obligation to regularly reconsider 
and update the permit conditions.195 According to article 21(3) IED, “within 
4years of publication of decisions on BAT conclusions in accordance with 
Article 15(3) […] the competent authority shall ensure that all the permit 
conditions for the installation concerned are reconsidered and, if necessary, 
updated”.  
As far as the second category of ‘BAT conclusions’ is concerned, this 
is comprised of ‘BREFs’ that have either been published by the Commission 
before the adoption of the IED or that have not yet been adopted through 
comitology.196 In this case these ‘BREF conclusions’ “shall apply as BAT 
conclusions […] except for Article 15(3) and (4)”.197 Therefore even though 
they are not binding in terms of their ELVs, these ‘BREFs’ nevertheless 
have considerable “authority in the permitting process”.198 In light of the 
above, the IED has been perceived as signifying a departure from the tenets 
of de-centralisation and flexibility embraced by the IPPCD. However, as it 
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will be subsequently discussed, a closer assessment of the IED’s regulatory 
edifice clearly rebuts this argument.  
 
2. BINDING ‘BREFS’ AND “OPEN BAT NORMS”199  
Bearing in mind the open ended character of the ‘BAT’ standard, it is not 
surprising that the ‘Sevilla process’ created “an expectation of 
closure”200,“of whittling down a whole range of possible BAT candidates to 
one or few specific BAT techniques” 201 , which are subsequently 
incorporated into sectoral ‘BREF’ documents. Accordingly, it would appear 
that it was precisely this expectation of closure, which underpinned the 
Commission's decision to enhance the legal status of ‘BREFs’ under the 
IED. The assumption seems to be that the binding ‘BAT conclusions’ will 
simplify the implementation process for Member States; particularly for the 
weaker among them.202 However, as Lee contends “there is not always a 
simple read-across from BAT conclusions to permit conditions”.203 In the 
same vein, Lange perceives the ‘BAT’ norms generated by the ‘Sevilla 
process’ “as situated on a sliding scale with various degrees of openness and 
closure”.204 In their crudest form “closed norms”205 resemble “hard, state 
law” 206 , explicitly prescribing the BAT/BATs for a sector. 207  On the 
contrary, “open norms”208 lack “prescriptive force”209 as they fail to identify 
the BAT/BATs.210 Nevertheless, the existence of ‘BAT’ norms with varying 
degrees of openness is not inherently problematic or undesirable. Taking 
into account the differences between industrial installations, the ‘open’ 
character of ‘BAT conclusions’ provides competent authorities with the 
necessary flexibility for their accommodation. The ‘BAT Conclusions on the 
iron and steel production”211, one of the first to be adopted under the IED, 
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are instructive in this sense. Even though a number of techniques are listed 
as ‘BAT’ under the specific ‘BATC’, their applicability is nevertheless 
contingent upon a number of factors; including not only the “layout of the 
plant and space requirements”212 but also the potential “high investment and 
operational costs”.213 Moreover the ELVs associated with these techniques 
(BATAELs) are “expressed as ranges rather than as single values”214 in 
order to “reflect the differences within a given type of installation (for 
instance differences in design, construction, size and capacity of the 
installation)”.215 
 In light of the above, it becomes evident that “even with mandatory 
BAT conclusions, national regulators still have a crucial and difficult 
evaluative role”.216 And although this is perfectly in line with the Directive’s 
principle that “varied local conditions, require varied local environmental 
regulation”217, the concern about the inability of certain states and their 
competent authorities to successfully fulfil their aforementioned role 
remains. In addition, methodologies developed under the “BREF on 
economics and cross-media effects” 218  to assist the Sevilla process’ 
participants in their ‘BAT’ determinations, are of limited use at local level 
determinations. 219  More importantly, even these methodologies do not 
absolve national authorities from difficult value judgments. As is explicitly 
stated in the pertinent ‘BREF’ “the methodology cannot make the decision, 
it is just a tool”220 aimed at assisting the actual decision-maker. 
 
3. “THE DEROGATION FROM BATAEL CLAUSE”221 
Whilst the introduction of a comitology procedure and the binding character 
of the ‘BAT conclusions’ adopted through it were perceived as facilitating a 
more consistent application of the ‘BAT standard’, the IED’s derogation 
clause appeared to challenge this presumption. Article 15(4) IED allows 
competent authorities to set “less strict emission limit values” than those laid 
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down in the binding ‘BAT conclusions’, provided that certain conditions are 
met. More specifically such derogation is only possible if the application of 
‘BAT conclusions’ “would lead to disproportionately higher costs compared 
to the environmental benefits due to: (a) the geographical location or the 
local environmental conditions of the installation concerned; or (b) the 
technical characteristics of the installation concerned”. To begin with, this 
derogation clause essentially crystallises the Directive’s “ethos that 
divergent conditions may require divergent responses”.222 Bearing in mind 
the diversity of environmental conditions within different Member States, 
the IED, similarly to its predecessor, did not aim at “providing uniform 
substantive environmental standards”. 223  On the contrary it sought to 
establish a regulatory framework, which whilst being more hard-edged than 
the former (IPPCD), it still remains responsive to diverse circumstances. 
And while Lee acknowledged the significance of the IED’s deference to 
local conditions, she nevertheless expressed concerns about the clause’s 
potential to generate the same “implementation difficulties and 
divergence”224 as the ones observed under the IPPCD. Indeed, not only is the 
cost-benefit analysis mandated by the derogation clause fraught with 
difficulties (as any CBA for that matter), but it is also couched in rather 
vague terms.225 For instance, the ‘disproportionate’ character of the costs 
leaves plenty of room for subjective interpretations. 
 Nevertheless, similarly to the IPPCD, the flexibility afforded to 
competent authorities under article 15(4) IED is woven in a framework of 
“substantive and procedural constraints”.226 Accordingly, article 15(4) IED 
explicitly authorises the derogation from “BAT as described in BAT 
conclusions”. It does not therefore sanction any derogation from the ‘BAT’ 
standard, the application of which remains mandatory even in the absence of 
specific ‘BAT conclusions’.227 Moreover, the application of the derogation 
clause “without prejudice to article 18”228 illustrates the significant role 
played by ‘ambient-based’ standards under the Directive. Not only are 
competent authorities expected to set permit conditions that are stricter than 
those in ‘BAT conclusions’ in order to adhere to these EQS229; they are also 
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obliged to comply with them even when they exercise their power under 
article 15(4) IED. The “European Safety Net”230, as currently crystallised in 
the “minimum EU-wide ELVs” 231  contained in Annexes V-VII IED, 
represents a further limit to article’s 18 IED derogation clause. Similarly, the 
obligation imposed upon competent authorities “to ensure that no significant 
pollution is caused and that a high level of protection of the environment as a 
whole is achieved”232 further constrains the flexibility provided by article 
15(4) IED.  
 Furthermore, article 15(4) IED introduces a number of procedural 
constraints, which complement the aforementioned substantive ones. To 
begin with, even prior to the adoption of the IED, the Commission attached 
considerable importance to the then non-binding ‘BREF’ documents. In fact 
these ‘BREFs’ were “sometimes treated as quasi-legally binding”233 and 
there was an expectation that the imposition of more lenient conditions than 
those included in them would be “explicable in terms of BAT”.234 More 
importantly this expectation was coupled with the potential of a challenge in 
front of the ECJ.235 It is precisely this expectation that was transformed into 
a legal obligation under article 15(4) IED. Accordingly, the competent 
authority is obliged to “document in an annex to the permit conditions the 
reasons for the application (of the derogation clause) including […] the 
justification for the conditions imposed”. Moreover, this “reason giving 
obligation” 236  is further enhanced by the second set of procedural 
constraints; the reporting obligations imposed upon Member States and the 
Commission by articles 72(1) and 73(1) IED respectively. According to the 
former Member States are expected to provide the Commission with 
information on, inter alia, “the application of best available techniques in 
accordance with articles 14 and 15 and in particular on the granting of 
exemptions in accordance with article 15(4)”. 237  Within the European 
Union’s regulatory framework, the reports provided by Member States 
represent the main means through which the Commission exercises its role 
as “the guardian of the Treaties”.238 To begin with, these reports could 
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potentially form the basis of infringement proceedings; for instance for non-
application of the ‘BAT’ standard or for breach of article’s 15(4) IED 
reason-giving obligation (e.g. non-existent or spurious justification). 239 
Furthermore, these reports could indicate the need for further clarification of 
article’s 15(4) IED procedural and substantive criteria. 240  The legal 
significance of any such clarification will be limited though, since the latter 
will be provided by the Commission through non-binding guidance. Finally 
according to article 73(1) IED, these national reports will form the basis of 
the Commission’s periodic reports on the implementation of the IED. More 
importantly, this article imposes upon the Commission the obligation, within 
specific time-frame, “to assess the need for Union action through the 
establishment or updating of Union-wide minimum requirements for 
emission limit values” 241 and “where appropriate”242 to submit a legislative 
proposal. The EEB greeted this provision since it allows for the expansion of 
the currently rather weak ‘European Safety Net’ 243 , with subsequent 
implications for article’s 15(4) IED derogation clause.244 Even though there 
is some truth in the aforementioned arguments, the Commission’s reliance 
on information provided either directly by Member States or through 
petitions and complaints, the poor quality of the reports and the fact that 
resort to the CJEU is only reserved for the most egregious cases, essentially 
dictate the way in which the Commission discharges its functions under the 
IED.245  
 A final procedural constraint is introduced by article 24 IED. 
According to the latter, both the decision to deviate from ‘BAT conclusions’ 
and the “specific reasons”246 that support it, should be made available to the 
public. By supplementing the Commission’s overview with this form of 
public scrutiny, the expectation seems to be that competent authorities will 
demonstrate considerable diligence in exercising their power under article 
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15(4) IED; essentially that they will only abstain from the application of 
‘BAT conclusions’ if they can “find, reflect on and disclose the reasons”.247 
This clearly indicates the “instrumental understanding” 248  of public 
participation endorsed by the Directive. Within the Directive’s edifice the 
public undertakes the significant role of policing its implementation on the 
ground. Nonetheless, as has already been implied, the extent to which the 
public will actually be able to play its envisaged role under the IED is highly 
debatable.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The cornerstone of the European Union’s industrial pollution regulatory 
edifice, the IED was perceived as the answer to the IPPC Directive’s 
“implementation gap”. Premised upon the same principles as its predecessor, 
it established a permitting system aimed at achieving “a high level of 
protection of the environment taken as a whole”. 249  Even though the 
Directive appears, at least on the face of it, as capable of achieving its goal, a 
thorough assessment of its provisions critically challenges this perception. 
Indeed a number of concerns about the ‘unbalanced’ character of the ‘Sevilla 
process’ and the political character of the debates taking place in its TWGs, 
still remain in existence under the new regime. The role of the “BREF on 
economics and cross-media effects”250 in enhancing the transparency of the 
process is rather limited, as “even the most perfect methodology is no 
solution to poor data”. 251  Moreover the power of NGOs, as formal 
participants in the ‘Sevilla process’, to exercise internal or “peer scrutiny”252 
is equally constrained. And the same appears to hold true for the role of the 
public as facilitator of “external scrutiny”.253 The potential of the new 
comitology committee to foster the transparency of the ‘Sevilla process’ is 
also questionable. In addition, it is expected that the former will accentuate 
the, already highly criticised, politicisation of the process.  
 In the same vein, academics have excessively questioned the extent to 
which the status of the ‘BAT’ standard is truly enhanced by the IED. 
Accordingly, debates over the more hard-edged, centralised character of the 
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IED have primarily focused on the binding status of the ‘BAT conclusions’. 
However, the ‘open’ character of the ‘BAT’ norms contained in them, 
coupled with article’s 15(4) IED derogation clause, appear to challenge this 
presumption. It is unarguably true that the IED aspires, as its predecessor, to 
a highly conditional flexibility.254 The existence of significant substantive 
and procedural constraints does not mean that flexibility does not exist. In 
fact even these constraints may not be as powerful as they may initially 
seem. Subsequently, the substantive conditions provide ample room for 
subjective assessments. And even though reporting obligations are 
understood as capable of imbuing national authorities with diligence in the 
exercise of their functions, this is far from straightforward.  
 In light of the above it could be concluded that the Directive’s 
“learning curve”255 has yet to produce a straight line. Within the wider 
debate over the appropriate mode of environmental governance in the 
European Union, the Directive’s adherence to ‘new, old governance’ raises 
serious concerns about its future. 
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